CVE-2025-11203
UNKNOWNLiteLLM's health endpoint leaks API keys to any authenticated user, exposing credentials for every connected LLM provider (OpenAI, Anthropic, Azure OpenAI, etc.). Patch to v1.63.14+ immediately and rotate all API keys stored in your LiteLLM deployment. Audit health endpoint access logs retroactively — if LiteLLM is internet-facing with shared credentials, assume compromise.
Severity & Risk
Recommended Action
- 1. PATCH: Upgrade LiteLLM to v1.63.14-stable immediately — this is a targeted fix per release notes. 2. ROTATE: Rotate all API keys stored in LiteLLM configuration post-patch; revoke the old keys at the provider level. 3. AUDIT: Query logs for GET/POST requests to /health endpoint with API_KEY parameter from the past 90 days. 4. RESTRICT: Limit access to the health endpoint via network ACLs or API gateway policies — it should not be publicly reachable. 5. SCOPE: Replace shared high-privilege provider API keys with scoped keys (spending limits, restricted models) to reduce blast radius of future credential leaks. 6. DETECT: Alert on health endpoint access by non-admin authenticated users.
Classification
Compliance Impact
This CVE is relevant to:
Technical Details
NVD Description
LiteLLM Information health API_KEY Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of LiteLLM. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the handling of the API_KEY parameter provided to the health endpoint. The issue results from exposing sensitive information to an unauthorized actor. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose stored credentials, leading to further compromise. Was ZDI-CAN-26585.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker with any valid LiteLLM API key — obtained via a phishing campaign targeting a developer, a leaked .env file in a public repo, or a compromised CI/CD secret — authenticates to the LiteLLM proxy and queries the /health endpoint passing their API_KEY. The response returns stored provider credentials (e.g., OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) in plaintext. The attacker extracts these keys, establishes direct API access to provider accounts bypassing LiteLLM entirely, and uses them to exfiltrate training data context via inference queries, run unauthorized inference at the victim's expense, or sell the credentials on darknet markets. The original compromised LiteLLM key may never trigger downstream provider alerts.