CVE-2026-27498

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to versions 2.2.0 and 1.123.8, an authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could chain the Read/Write Files from Disk node with git operations to achieve remote code execution. By writing to specific configuration files and then triggering a git operation, the attacker could execute arbitrary shell commands on the n8n host. The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.2.0 and 1.123.8. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations. Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only, and/or disable the Read/Write Files from Disk node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.readWriteFile` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

An attacker with a compromised developer account (or a malicious insider) logs into the n8n UI with standard workflow-editor permissions. They create a new workflow containing a Write File node that writes a malicious script to a git hook path (e.g., `.git/hooks/post-checkout`) or patches `.git/config` with a malicious `core.sshCommand` value. They then add a downstream node that triggers a git pull or git checkout operation on a repository the n8n process has access to. When the workflow runs, git executes the attacker-controlled hook, spawning a reverse shell or downloading a second-stage implant. From this foothold, the attacker pivots to exfiltrate LLM API keys, model weights, training datasets, and downstream database credentials embedded in other workflows — all without any elevated initial access.