Attack HIGH relevance

Red-teaming the Multimodal Reasoning: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models via Cross-modal Entanglement Attacks

Yu Yan Sheng Sun Shengjia Cheng Teli Liu Mingfeng Li Min Liu
Published
February 9, 2026
Updated
February 9, 2026

Abstract

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) with multimodal reasoning capabilities are high-value attack targets, given their potential for handling complex multimodal harmful tasks. Mainstream black-box jailbreak attacks on VLMs work by distributing malicious clues across modalities to disperse model attention and bypass safety alignment mechanisms. However, these adversarial attacks rely on simple and fixed image-text combinations that lack attack complexity scalability, limiting their effectiveness for red-teaming VLMs' continuously evolving reasoning capabilities. We propose \textbf{CrossTALK} (\textbf{\underline{Cross}}-modal en\textbf{\underline{TA}}ng\textbf{\underline{L}}ement attac\textbf{\underline{K}}), which is a scalable approach that extends and entangles information clues across modalities to exceed VLMs' trained and generalized safety alignment patterns for jailbreak. Specifically, {knowledge-scalable reframing} extends harmful tasks into multi-hop chain instructions, {cross-modal clue entangling} migrates visualizable entities into images to build multimodal reasoning links, and {cross-modal scenario nesting} uses multimodal contextual instructions to steer VLMs toward detailed harmful outputs. Experiments show our COMET achieves state-of-the-art attack success rate.

Pro Analysis

Full threat analysis, ATLAS technique mapping, compliance impact assessment (ISO 42001, EU AI Act), and actionable recommendations are available with a Pro subscription.

Threat Deep-Dive
ATLAS Mapping
Compliance Reports
Actionable Recommendations
Start 14-Day Free Trial